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The strategy aims to prevent New Zealand 
governments from making monetary, 
fiscal and regulatory decisions that erode 
wealth, by removing such decisions from 
cyclical politics. Former Treasury secretary 
Graham Scott encapsulated this ideal 
shortly before the 2008 election when he 
called for action to ‘address the agenda 
of quasi-constitutional issues that might, 
either in specific areas or perhaps more 
generally, address openly the clash between 
short-term political incentives and long-
term wealth creation.’ The Reserve Bank 
Act offered the ‘prime example of success 
of this kind of design’ (Scott, 2008).
This article examines the prospects for 
‘regulatory responsibility’ as an instrument 
for embedded neoliberalism and 
concludes that the necessary conditions 
are either not there or not sustainable. It 
argues that political consensus is eroding. 
Faith in markets to regulate has been 
severely damaged in New Zealand and 
internationally. New Zealand’s track re-
cord contradicts the article of faith that less 
regulation holds the key to international 
competitiveness. Threats of investor 
backlash if governments re-regulate 
markets and redistribute wealth generate a 
sterile spectator democracy which cannot 
deal effectively with crises. Moves to lock 
governments into a neoliberal paradigm 
deliberately constrain the generation and 
pursuit of necessary alternatives. 
If at First You Don’t Succeed
The neoliberal regulatory regime has 
proved more difficult to enact than its 
monetary and fiscal counterparts, so far 
spanning 15 years. In 1994 the Finance 
and Expenditure Committee on the 
Fiscal Responsibility Bill, chaired by Ruth 
Richardson, called for work to address 
‘the adequacy of existing regulatory 
processes to produce quality regulation’. In 
November 1997 the Cabinet Committee on 
Jane Kelsey is a Professor of Law at the 
University of Auckland, and is one of New 
Zealand’s best-known critical commentators on 
issues of globalisation, structural adjustment and 
decolonisation. She is the author of numerous 
books and articles on the neoliberal restructuring 
of New Zealand since 1984, including the best-
selling The New Zealand Experiment. A World 
Model for Structural Adjustment?’. Her latest 
book on globalisation, Serving Whose Interests? 
The Political Economy of Trade in Services 
Agreements, was published by Routledge in 
2008.
‘Regulatory 
Responsibility’:
Embedded Neoliberalism  
and its Contradictions
Jane Kelsey
The proposed Regulatory Responsibility Bill is part of the 
unfinished business of regime change (Wade, 2008) from 
Keynesian welfarism to neoliberalism between 1984 and 
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Strategy and Priorities agreed in principle 
to a proposal by National’s commerce 
minister John Luxton for a Regulatory 
Responsibility Act modeled on the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (CSP(97)M42/9). 
When the momentum stalled, the 
New Zealand Business Roundtable 
hosted a workshop, Towards a Regulatory 
Constitution, which featured Richard 
Epstein (Epstein, 2000). With other 
business groups it commissioned 
Bryce Wilkinson’s report Constraining 
Government Regulation (Wilkinson, 2001), 
which expanded the Luxton proposal into 
a draft bill with a long list of profoundly 
ideological regulatory principles. A 
slightly reworked version was introduced 
as ACT MP Rodney Hide’s Regulatory 
Responsibility Bill 2006. In May 2008 the 
Commerce Committee recommended 
that the Hide bill not be passed and that 
a high-level expert task force should 
examine various options to improve 
regulatory review and decision making.
Given this history, it was obvious that 
the incoming National-led government 
would come under strong pressure to 
pass the legislation. A key plank in the 
confidence and supply agreement between 
National and ACT was the establishment 
of a taskforce to carry forward work 
on the Hide bill. Hide became the 
minister for regulatory reform. Roger 
Douglas became responsible for the bill. 
Graham Scott was appointed to chair the 
Regulatory Taskforce, which reported with 
a refined version of the Hide legislation in 
September 2009. 
‘Better Regulation, Less Regulation’
For reasons discussed below, the legislative 
passage of the Regulatory Responsibility 
Bill is not guaranteed. Perhaps in 
anticipation of this, a month before the 
release of the taskforce report Cabinet 
endorsed a ministerial statement entitled 
‘Better Regulation, Less Regulation’ (CAB 
Min (09) 27/11). The August 2009 package 
serves two functions: it strengthens the 
existing regulatory impact assessment 
mechanisms and reorients them towards 
risk-tolerant deregulation which aims to 
accept or manage rather than eliminate 
risk (Dodds, 2006, p.527); and it provides 
a fall-back position in case the bill is 
defeated.
The centrepiece is the statement 
from the ministers of finance and 
regulatory reform, ‘Better Regulation, 
Less Regulation’, with which ministers 
and officials must now comply. New 
regulation will be introduced only where 
it is ‘required, reasonable and robust’, 
while existing regulation will be reviewed 
‘to identify and remove requirements that 
are unnecessary, ineffective or excessively 
costly’. Specifically, the government will 
not take a regulatory decision without 
considering ‘the evidence, advice and 
feedback from consultation’, and being 
fully satisfied that:
• the problem cannot be adequately 
addressed through private arrange-
ments and a regulatory solution is 
required in the public interest;
• all practical options for addressing the 
problem have been considered;
• the benefits of the preferred option not 
only exceed the costs (taking account 
of all relevant considerations) but will 
deliver the highest level of net benefit 
of the practical regulatory options 
available;
• the proposed obligations or entitle-
ments are clear, easily understood and 
conform as far as possible to established 
legislative principles and best practice 
formulations; and
• implementation issues, costs and 
risks have been fully assessed and 
addressed.
A higher burden of proof applies to 
regulatory proposals that are likely to: 
• impose additional costs on business 
during the current economic 
recession; 
• impair private property rights, market 
competition or the incentives on 
businesses to innovate and invest; or
• override fundamental common law 
principles (as referenced in chapter 3 
of the Legislation Advisory Committee 
guidelines).
Cabinet imposed a raft of ex ante and 
ex post requirements on ministers and 
officials. The ex ante measures involve 
more rigorous market-focused audit 
mechanisms, open-ended advice from 
officials on regulatory options, stricter 
surveillance by the Treasury-based 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Team 
(RIAT) and certification of consistency by 
ministers and officials. 
Departments must prepare an 
annual regulatory plan of all known and 
anticipated proposals to introduce, amend, 
repeal or review legislation or regulation, 
to the extent possible. Regulatory impact 
statements (RIS) become government 
documents that advise Cabinet on problem 
definition, objectives, identification 
and analysis for the full range of 
practical options, without necessarily 
recommending a preferred policy. Agency 
certification of the RIS must disclose 
any gaps, assumptions, deficiencies or 
uncertainties in the analysis and indicate 
policy options whose effects are not likely 
to align to the government statement. 
Independent quality assurance of RIS will 
be provided by the RIAT where regulation 
has significant effects on economic 
growth, and otherwise by a person in 
the sponsoring agency independent of 
the authors. Ministers must certify that 
they have carefully considered whether 
the proposals to Cabinet are consistent 
with the expectations in the government 
statement.
The ex post measures require a post-
implementation review of ‘significant’ 
regulations that Cabinet may agree 
to despite non-compliance with the 
government statement. Such reviews 
must be signed off by the responsible 
minister and the ministers of finance and 
regulatory reform. All departments must 
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Page 38 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 6, Issue 2 – May 2010
develop systems for regulatory scans that 
identify all primary, secondary and where 
possible tertiary regulation under their 
responsibility that is or may be unnecessary, 
ineffective or excessively costly. The initial 
scan must be completed by 30 June 2010, 
with subsequent six-monthly reports. 
An annual Regulatory Reform Bill, 
presumably of an omnibus kind, will ‘make 
it quicker and easier to remove or simplify 
unnecessary, ineffective or excessively 
costly requirements in primary legislation’. 
A raft of existing reviews of regulatory 
regimes will continue, particularly those 
considered to have a significant impact on 
productivity. These requirements are to 
be fully operational by mid-2010. 
Adoption of the taskforce’s 
recommendations would add six further 
elements to the regime. First, the proposed 
Regulatory Responsibility Act sets out 
principles categorised under ‘Rule of 
Law’, ‘Liberties’, Taking of Property’, ‘Taxes 
and Charges’, ‘Role of Courts’ and ‘Good 
Lawmaking’, and compliance obligations 
including certification. Second, ministerial 
guidelines would be issued pursuant to 
the act. Third, private actors could seek 
judicial declarations of incompatibility 
stating that proposed legislation is 
incompatible with the principles in the 
act, extending to existing legislation after 
ten years. Fourth, judges would have to 
adopt a statutory interpretation that is 
consistent with the principles, where 
possible. Fifth, a permanent external 
Statutory Advisory Council would be 
mandated to review the general body 
of legislation, and specific proposed or 
existing legislation, against the principles 
in the act and ministerial guidelines, 
and consult with public entities where 
appropriate. Lastly, the parliamentary 
Regulations Review Committee would be 
empowered to consider submissions that 
proposed or existing legislation departs 
from the principles.
There is obvious overlap between 
the criteria in the government statement 
and the taskforce principles, especially 
on regulatory ‘takings’, and in various 
procedures, such as ministerial certification 
and regular reviews of existing legislation 
for compatibility with the principles. 
It is understandable that most 
debate has focused on the taskforce. 
Various of its proposals would unsettle 
the traditional distribution of formal 
constitutional responsibilities between 
the executive, parliament and judiciary. 
Its recommendations aim to empower 
corporations and investors to pressure 
governments to advance their vested 
interests through a range of judicial, 
parliamentary and ‘expert’ mechanisms. 
And it has an ideological agenda that 
builds on previous proposals that are 
linked directly or indirectly to ACT and 
the Business Roundtable.
By comparison, cabinet’s August 
package has come in under the radar. Like 
the taskforce report, it sets out to reorder 
the priorities, activities and resources of 
government agencies to privilege market 
interests and mechanisms. Its more 
rigorous mechanisms will strengthen 
Treasury’s surveillance role over all other 
state agencies, and presumably will be 
reinforced through performance indicators 
and purchasing contracts. The requirement 
that these new obligations are met from 
within existing departmental budgets will 
divert resources from substantive policy 
and regulatory initiatives and subordinate 
pro-social interventions. 
Embedded neoliberalism?
This section of the article examines 
whether the ‘responsible regulation’ 
strategy is likely to succeed as an 
instrument for embedded neoliberalism. It 
considers and rejects claims to legitimacy 
based on its quasi-constitutional status, 
preferring to describe the legislation as 
‘meta-regulation’. It then argues that 
the political, normative, economic, 
reputational and institutional conditions 
that are necessary for its enactment, 
effective implementation and long-term 
sustainability do not exist. 
Constitutionalism
Successfully ascribing ‘constitutional’ 
status to a piece of ordinary legislation 
bolsters its credibility and durability. 
Advocates of a Regulatory Responsibility 
Bill have consistently talked up its 
constitutional pedigree. A prime example 
is the Business Roundtable’s workshop 
Towards a Regulatory Constitution. 
Keynote speaker Richard Epstein argued 
for protection against regulatory takings 
that violated constitutional guarantees 
of private property, with other aspects of 
‘government intrusion’ to be addressed 
through ‘either a major regulatory 
constitution or some other means of 
imposing constitutional restraint on 
government’ (Epstein, 2000, p.5). 
That discourse draws on the 
‘constitutional economics’ of James 
Buchanan, leader of the public choice 
school with its deeply cynical view of 
electoral politics and state bureaucracy. 
Buchanan’s fiscal and monetary 
constitutionalism centres on protecting 
wealth and removing the constraints 
on accumulation that were imposed 
during the 20th century. His ideal of 
‘constitutional politics’ provides a set of 
quasi-permanent rules that define the 
parameters for ‘ordinary politics’ and 
law making and impose disciplines that 
require governments to make ‘choices 
within constraints’ (Buchanan, 1991, 
pp.4-5).
The segue from the public-law 
meaning of ‘constitutional’ as supreme 
law which distributes sovereign power 
within a state to the ‘constitutional’ status 
of ordinary legislation is seductive and 
misleading. The Buchanan and Epstein 
theories of economic constitutionalism 
rely on a narrow 17th-century version 
of the rule of law and the presence of 
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constitution-like characteristics, notably 
pre-established criteria and processes 
that aim to depoliticise decisions of 
elected governments and pre-commit 
governments to a set of general principles, 
norms or outcomes. The state is relegated 
to a self-limiting role vis-à-vis capital. 
State actors are required to regulate in the 
interests of wealth accumulation, while 
non-market and pro-social objectives are 
constrained. 
The international literature has 
developed a number of alternative terms 
that depict the neoliberal regulatory 
regime more accurately and with less 
hyperbole. Cass Sunstein described 
the Reaganite Republicans’ proposed 
Contract with America (Gingrich and 
Armey, 1994) and alternative regulatory 
charters as ‘supermandates’ whose 
requirements, if implemented, would 
have cut across all regulatory statutes 
(Sunstein, 1996, p.270). He distinguished 
between ‘substantive supermandates’ 
that enact new decisional criteria that 
agencies must follow, such as a general 
requirement for cost-benefit balancing, 
and ‘procedural supermandates’ that 
dictate processes. In the European context 
Claudio Radaelli has described the 
regulatory impact assessment as a ‘meta-
policy’ that sets rules on the process of 
rule formation (Radaelli, 2007, p.196). 
Bronwen Morgan, writing of Australian 
competition policy, applies the term 
meta-regulation to describe ‘a set of 
institutions and processes that embed 
regulatory review mechanisms into the 
every-day routines of governmental 
policy-making’ (Morgan, 1999, p.50).
Political conditions
Because meta-regulation assumes the 
power to constrain the government’s op-
tions, it still requires legitimation. The 
Regulatory Responsibility Bill draws 
heavily on analogies with the Reserve 
Bank Act 1989 and the Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act 1994, which until recently have 
been treated as qualitatively superior to 
ordinary statutes. But the political cli-
mate has turned. There was cross-party 
consensus when the Reserve Bank Act 
and Fiscal Responsibility Act were in-
troduced. That no longer exists. In No-
vember 2009 Labour formally ended the 
bipartisan consensus on the monetary 
policy targets and tools of the Reserve 
Bank (Goff, 2009). It seems untenable 
that Labour would embrace a better 
drafted but in some ways more extreme 
version of the Hide bill, when the need 
for the legislation is commonly blamed 
on Labour’s preference for central plan-
ning and redistribution (Scott, 2008).
The troubled history of the 
Regulatory Responsibility Bill shows that 
there never was a bipartisan consensus, 
despite the assertion in the taskforce’s 
terms of reference that it was ‘carrying 
forward the Commerce Committee’s 
work’ on the Hide bill in the Labour era. 
The implication of seamless continuity 
is disingenuous. The select committee 
proposed a high-level taskforce to 
consider options for improving regulatory 
review and decision making, including 
through legislation and standing orders, 
but not limited to the options that were 
placed before it. The National/ACT 
taskforce was required to recommend a 
draft bill. 
Moreover, the select committee said 
the chair should be an expert who has 
not been involved in advocating for or 
against any of the options. Graham Scott 
was a strong advocate of a Hide-style bill, 
as were many of the committee members. 
The announcement of its membership 
suggests a desire to downplay their 
partisan positions: Don Turkington was 
described blandly as a ‘company director’, 
rather than the director of the Centre 
for Independent Studies in Sydney. 
Confirming its ideological predilections, 
the foreword to the report gives special 
thanks to Richard Epstein. 
Indeed, the bill may not even secure 
consensus support from the governing 
coalition, especially in election year. 
Ministers might justifiably fear that 
populist legislation like ACT’s three 
strikes law or National’s emissions 
trading regime would fail any rigorous 
cost-benefit analysis, including the 
proposed bill. A pre-election audit of 
National, ACT, Future NZ and Mäori 
Party manifestos against the bill’s 
principles could prove embarrassing. An 
attack by Labour and the Greens which 
cites examples of popular moderate laws 
that could be struck down by the return 
of neoliberal extremism would generate 
real political traction. 
Even if the legislation were to be passed 
under National, there is no guarantee it 
would survive a change of government 
in one or four years time. The Cabinet 
regime that was implemented without 
the need for any parliamentary scrutiny is 
an even less secure vehicle for embedding 
neoliberalism.
Normative conditions
The principles and objectives of meta-
regulation also need some normative 
grounding. At the most superficial 
level, slogans like ‘better regulation’ and 
‘regulatory responsibility’ have positive 
connotations that marginalise critics: 
who wants to defend worse regulation 
or regulatory irresponsibility? The 
principles of ‘responsible regulation’ are 
also equated to the national interest. 
According to the explanatory note to 
Hide’s bill: ‘Regardless of differences 
over policy, Acts and regulations will be 
constitutionally sound and in the public 
interest if they respect such principles.’ 
But light-handed pro-market regu-
lation can no longer claim to be uncon-
tested orthodoxy. A generation of New 
Zealanders rejected its economic funda-
mentalism in the 1990s. More recently, a 
series of high-profile regulatory failures, 
... a series of high-
profile regulatory 
failures, from leaky 
buildings and 
finance companies 
to electricity and 
telecommunications, 
has generated 
scepticism that 
markets and corporate 
interests can 
deliver ‘responsible’ 
regulation.   
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from leaky buildings and finance com-
panies to electricity and telecommunica-
tions, has generated scepticism that mar-
kets and corporate interests can deliver 
‘responsible’ regulation. 
Similar shifts are evident 
internationally. The Reserve Bank and 
fiscal responsibility legislation drew on 
the ascendant international orthodoxy 
of monetarism and fiscal austerity, 
encapsulated in the Washington 
Consensus. The regulatory responsibility 
regime rests its claim to orthodoxy on 
the adoption by most OECD countries of 
regulatory management regimes that use 
regulatory impact assessments and cost-
benefit analysis (Malyshev, 2006) and 
the guidelines and checklists for ‘quality 
regulation’ developed by the OECD and 
APEC (OECD, 1995; APEC/OECD, 2005). 
Again, ‘orthodoxy’ overstates the case. 
Many of the New Zealand proposals, 
such as declarations of incompatibility 
and compensation for ‘takings’, are at 
the extreme end of the OECD spectrum. 
They are closest to the United Kingdom 
approach, where the flagship financial 
services regime failed so dramatically in 
the post-2007 financial crisis. 
Economic conditions
The economic rationale for a neoliberal 
regulatory regime is that over-regulation 
is damaging New Zealand’s international 
competitiveness. The Cabinet paper in 
August 2009 argued that New Zealand 
needs a ‘better’ regulatory environment 
than its OECD peers to boost its 
international competitiveness. In support 
it cited the OECD’s opinion that ‘mediocre 
policies will not be enough to overcome 
the economic disadvantages of New 
Zealand’s small size and geographical 
isolation’, and the fact that other OECD 
countries often struggled to maintain 
regulatory discipline.
There is no logical nexus. As Chye-
Ching Huang points out, New Zealand 
already has a relatively high international 
ranking for core economic regulation: 
second in the world in the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business rankings, and 
fifth in the Heritage Foundation and Wall 
Street Journal Economic Freedom Index 
(Huang, 2010, p.95). Moreover, the OECD’s 
2009 Economic Survey highlighted the 
paradox that New Zealand was at the 
forefront in adopting purportedly high-
growth policies, but still ranks toward the 
bottom end of the OECD’s productivity 
league. ‘Better Regulation, Less Regulation’ 
and the Regulatory Responsibility Bill are 
seeking to embed that strategy.
Reputational conditions
When political, normative and economic 
conditions turn sour, the most reliable 
bulwark against regime change is to create 
fear of reputational damage to politicians 
and the country from a crisis of business 
confidence. In a return to pre-democratic 
17th-century politics, the propertied 
become privileged political actors who are 
empowered to promote and protect their 
individual and class interests. Positive 
political economists colourfully describe 
the support mechanisms as ‘stacking the 
deck’ and setting up the ‘fire alarms’. 
Radaelli argues that regulatory impact 
assessments do not exist to ensure ‘quality’ 
for its own sake (Radaelli, 2008, p.6). 
Principles, such as ‘the benefits must 
exceed the costs’, and hurdles, such as ‘no 
new rules unless a market failure is proven 
beyond doubt’, ‘stack the deck’ to ensure 
the broad political trajectories of policies 
are maintained, even if majorities change. 
Fire alarms, such as published regulatory 
impact analyses, alert the business 
constituency when something ‘dangerous’ 
is under contemplation. 
While the August 2009 ministerial 
statement both stacks the deck and 
installs the fire alarms, the taskforce goes 
much further. It creates opportunities for 
business interests to intervene at select 
committees, through judicial processes, 
seeking reviews by the Regulation Review 
Committee or by participating in the 
‘independent oversight’ of regulation. 
The paradox of public choice comes 
to the fore: the rent-seeking business 
community becomes the guardian of the 
public interest while elected politicians are 
pincered between threats of investor flight 
and credit downgrades and an electoral 
backlash against corporate dominance, 
failure to deliver on manifesto promises 
or impotence in the face of crises.
Institutional conditions
The sustainability of the proposed regime 
also depends on its impact on effective 
public administration and the regulatory 
interventions that people expect from 
their governments. Both the Cabinet 
package and the proposed bill impose 
contested, complex and costly obligations 
on diverse public agencies in the guise of 
improving quality through rational and 
objective procedures and criteria. The 
methodology of ‘cost-benefit analysis’ 
is imbued with scientific qualities of 
certainty, precision and objectivity. But 
these assessments are not conducted in an 
antiseptic laboratory:
Law making is not a de-contextualised 
exercise in rational policy analysis, and 
tools like the standard cost model or 
cost benefit analysis are operated in a 
process that is contingent on specific 
institutional settings, history, and 
purposeful political action. (Radaelli, 
2007, p.7)
‘Better Regulation, Less Regulation’ 
requires officials and ministers to apply 
pro-market criteria for ‘quality regulation’ 
that are highly subjective and operate 
as closed reference points that exclude 
‘competing visions for the good society, 
different regulatory motivations and 
concerns about political and public 
legitimacy’ (Haines and Gurney, 2003, 
p.354). Ministries and communities 
of interest that have non-commercial 
responsibilities and appeal to different 
Lessons can and 
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compromise of the 
20th century, where 
the state was forced 
to step in to absorb, 
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ideological premises, values, priorities and 
constituencies will need to reconstruct 
their rationale in market terms if they are 
to be heard at all. 
The primacy of economic analysis over 
political bargains places the responsibility 
for ‘quality regulation’ on professional 
economists ahead of sector-specific policy 
experts. Scott presaged this reordering in 
his speech to the New Zealand Institute 
of Economic Research in 2008, when he 
recommended putting Treasury ‘back 
into high level regulatory policy from an 
economic development perspective’ after 
some of its functions were transferred ‘to 
organisations that are less concerned with 
economic analysis and more in tune with 
the central planning and coordination 
methods that have replaced it’ (Scott, 
2008). 
Finally, government agencies must 
be able to function. The August Cabinet 
paper acknowledged that some depart-
ments had concerns that ongoing regu-
latory scans would divert resources from 
other priorities and that implementation 
timeframes were unreasonable. Cabinet 
made it clear that there was no new fund-
ing. Presumably, resources would be re-
allocated to the deregulation project from 
regulatory activities that are likely to fall 
foul of the ministers’ statement and Trea-
sury surveillance. 
Far from improving the quality 
of government, Sunstein suggests 
that onerous, complex and subjective 
obligations are likely to have the reverse 
effect:
A system in which agencies decide 
what is to be done only after 
considering all costs and benefits is 
likely to be time-consuming and will 
inevitably produce large-scale errors. 
Such a system imposes enormous data 
collection requirements on agencies 
and forces them to make difficult and 
unscientific judgments about basic 
values. (Sunstein, 1996, p.301)
Contradictions
This article has argued that the necessary 
conditions do not exist for the ‘regulatory 
responsibility’ regime to advance its goal of 
embedding neoliberalism. The dogmatic 
pursuit of that project is profoundly 
irresponsible. 
It exemplifies what John Toye called 
the ‘Empowering Myth’, which freezes 
or concretises ideas, ‘losing sight of the 
fact that they are always in flux, always 
embedded in critical debate’ (Toye, 1994, 
p.39). Dominant paradigms are not set in 
stone. History shows that they are fluid 
and contested. Lessons can and should be 
learned from the historical compromise 
of the 20th century, where the state was 
forced to step in to absorb, collectivise 
and redistribute risks arising from a 
barely-regulated market. The turmoil 
of successive financial crises raises the 
spectre of history repeating itself.
Tragically, the obsession with paradigm 
maintenance prevents the exploration 
of viable alternatives. Truly responsible 
regulation would actively stimulate new 
ideas to meet the imminent challenges of 
global financial instability, energy scarcity, 
food shortages, global warming and the 
obscene imbalance of wealth and poverty.
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